Introduction
Key management systems are either based on negotiation and exchange directly between peers (e.g. Diffie-Hellman based schemes), predistribution of user credentials (shared secrets/certificates), or availability of a trusted Key Management Service (KMS). The modes described in the Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) specification [RFC3830] and its updates [RFC4650] [RFC4738] are all variants of the first two alternatives.
In security systems serving a large number of users, a solution based on a key management service is often preferred. With such a service in place, there is no need to pre-distribute credentials that directly can be used to establish security associations between peers for protected communication, as users can request such credentials when needed. Solutions based on a trusted key management service also scale well when the number of users grows.
This document introduces a set of new MIKEY modes that go under the common name MIKEY-TICKET. It supports a ticket concept, similar to that in Kerberos [RFC4120] , which is used to identify and deliver keys. A high level outline of MIKEY-TICKET as defined herein is that the Initiator requests keys and a ticket from the KMS and sends the ticket containing a reference to the keys, or the enveloped keys, to the Responder. The Responder then sends the ticket to the KMS, which returns the appropriate keys.
MIKEY-TICKET is primarily designed to fulfill the requirements for media plane security in the 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). This implies that some extensions to the basic Kerberos concept are needed. For instance, the Initiator may not always know the exact identity of the Responder when the communication with the key management server is initiated; forking is one such situation. This document updates [RFC3830] with the MIKEY-TICKET mode. It defines a signaling framework enabling peers to request, transfer, and resolve various ticket types using a key management service. A default ticket type is also defined.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] . Definitions of terms and notation will, unless otherwise stated, be as defined in [RFC3830] . Mattsson Key forking: When used in conjunction to forking, key forking refers to the process of modifying keys, making them cryptographically unique for each responder targeted by the forking.
(Media) session: The communication session intended to be secured by the MIKEY-TICKET provided key(s).
Session information: Information related to the security protocols used to protect the media session: keys, salts, algorithms, etc.
Ticket: A Kerberos-like object used to identify and deliver keys over an untrusted network.
Ticket Request: Exchange used by the Initiator to request keys and a ticket from a trusted KMS.
Ticket Transfer: Exchange used to transfer the ticket as well as session information from the Initiator to the Responder.
Ticket Resolve: Exchange used by the Responder to request the KMS to return the keys encoded in a ticket.
Ticket policy: Policy for ticket generation and resolution, allowed applications, key derivation, etc. Hash of the certificate used HDR:
Common Header payload ID:
Identity payload IDRx:
Identity of entity x IDRpsk:
Identifier for pre-shared key IDRapp:
Identifier for application/service KEMAC:
Key data transport payload PKE:
Encrypted envelope key RANDx:
Random value generated by entity x SIGNx:
Signature created using entity x's private key SP:
Security 
Design Considerations
As mentioned in the introduction, none of the previously defined MIKEY modes are based on a trusted KMS. The pre-shared key method and the public-key encryption method defined in [RFC3830] are examples of systems based on pre-distribution of user credentials. The Diffie-Hellman method [RFC3830] is an example of a system based on negotiation and exchange directly between peers.
In SIP, forking is the delivery of a request (e.g. INVITE) to multiple endpoints. This happens when a responder is registered on several devices (e.g. mobile phone, fixed phone, and computer) or when an invite is being made to addresses of the type somebody@company.example, a group of users where only one is supposed to answer. To prevent eavesdropping, only the endpoint that answers should get access to the session keys. The naive application of [RFC3830] where all endpoints share the same pre-shared/private key is not secure when it comes to forking as all endpoints get access to the session keys. Conversely, having per-user unique pre-shared keys/certificates creates more fundamental problems with forking, as the initiator does not know which pre-shared key/certificate to use at session initiation. Forking is described in [RFC5479] and the applicability of different MIKEY modes is discussed in [RFC5197] .
Deferred delivery of end-to-end protected content excludes all key management schemes that are based on some type of direct online negotiation between peers (e.g. Diffie-Hellman based schemes) as the responder cannot rely on contacting the initiator to get access to keys.
In security systems serving a large number of users, a solution based on a key management service is often preferred. With such a service in place, there is no need to pre-distribute credentials that directly can be used to establish security associations between peers for protected communication, as users can request such credentials when needed. In many applications, e.g. National Security and Public Safety (NSPS), the controlling organization wants to enforce policies on the use of keys. A trusted KMS fits these applications well as it makes it easier to enforce policies centrally. Solutions based on a trusted KMS also scale well when the number of users grows. A KMS based on symmetric keys has particular advantages as symmetric key algorithms are generally much less computationally intensive than asymmetric key algorithms.
Systems based on a key management service require a signaling mechanism that allows peers to retrieve other peers' credentials. A convenient way to implement such a signaling scheme is to use a ticket concept, similar to that in Kerberos [RFC4120] , to identify and deliver keys. The ticket can be forwarded in the signaling associated with the session setup. The initiator requests a ticket from the key management service and sends the ticket to the responder. The responder forwards the ticket to the key management service, which returns the corresponding keys. It should here be noted that Kerberos typically does not require that the responder also contacts the key management service. However, in order to support also the aforementioned forking scenarios it becomes necessary that the ticket is not bound to the exact identity (or credentials) of the responder until the final responder becomes fully determined. Group and forking communication scenarios can also be improved from access control point of view if authorization to access the key(s) can be enforced with higher granularity at the responder side.
The ticket can contain a reference to keys held by the key management system or it can hold the keys itself. In the latter case, the ticket needs to be confidentiality and integrity protected. In the following, the term encoded keys will be used to describe both cases as well as keys derived from such keys.
By using different ticket types and ticket policies, some allowing the initiator or responder to create or resolve the tickets without assistance from the KMS, a wide range of different security levels and use cases can be supported. This has a number of advantages as it offers a framework which is flexible enough to satisfy users with a broad range of security needs. The authorization function in the KMS could also be used to help solve the key access problem in forking and retargeting scenarios. The problems with retargeting are similar to forking. The use of a ticket based system may also help in the handling of keys for deferred delivery of end-to-end protected content to currently off-line users.
At the same time, it is also important to be aware that (centralized) key management services may introduce a single point of (security) failure. The security requirements on the implementation and protection of the KMS may therefore in high security applications be
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more or less equivalent to the requirements of an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) server or a Certificate Authority (CA).
A New Mode: MIKEY-TICKET
Overview
All previously defined MIKEY modes consist of a single (or half) roundtrip between two peers. MIKEY-TICKET differs from these modes as it consists of up to three different roundtrips (Ticket Request, Ticket Transfer, and Ticket Resolve) involving three parties (Initiator, Responder, and KMS). Since the number of roundtrips and order of messages may vary, MIKEY-TICKET is actually the common name for a set of modes, all revolving around a ticket concept. The third party, the KMS, is only involved in some of the MIKEY exchanges and not at all in the resulting secure media session. The Ticket Request and Ticket Resolve exchanges are meant to be used in combination with the Ticket Transfer exchange and not on their own. In Figure 1 , the signaling for the full three roundtrip MIKEY-TICKET mode is depicted. The Initiator (I) wants to establish a secure media session with the Responder (R). The Initiator and the Responder do not share any credentials, instead they trust a third party, the KMS, with which they both have or can establish shared credentials. Note that rather than a single KMS, multiple KMSs may be involved, e.g. one for the Initiator and one for the Responder; this is discussed in Section 9.
The Initiator requests keys and a ticket (encoding the same keys)
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from the KMS by sending a REQUEST_INIT message. The REQUEST_INIT message includes session information (e.g. identities of the allowed responders) and is protected via a MAC based on a pre-shared key or via a signature (similar to the pre-shared key and public-key encryption modes in [RFC3830] ). If the request is authorized, the KMS generates the requested keys, encodes them in a ticket, and returns the ticket in a REQUEST_RESP message. The Ticket Request exchange is optional (depending on the ticket type), and MAY be omitted if the Initiator can create the ticket without assistance from the KMS.
The Initiator next includes the ticket in a TRANSFER_INIT message, which is sent to the Responder. The TRANSFER_INIT message is protected via a MAC based on a MPK (MIKEY Protection Key) encoded in the ticket. If the Responder finds the proposed ticket policy and session security policies acceptable, the Responder forwards the ticket to the KMS. This is done with a RESOLVE_INIT message, which asks the KMS to return the keys encoded in the ticket. The RESOLVE_INIT message is protected via a MAC based on a pre-shared key (between Responder and KMS) or via a signature. The Ticket Resolve exchange is optional (depending on the ticket policy), and SHOULD only be used when the Responder is unable to resolve the ticket without assistance from the KMS.
The KMS resolves the ticket. If the Responder is authorized to receive the keys encoded in the ticket, the KMS retrieves the keys and other information. If key forking is used, the keys are modified (bound to the Responder) by the KMS, see Section 5.1.1. The keys and additional information are then sent in a RESOLVE_RESP message to the Responder, who sends a TRANSFER_RESP message to the Initiator as verification. The TRANSFER_RESP message might include information used for key derivation.
The use case and signaling described above is the full three exchange mode but other modes are allowed, see Section 4.1.1. Group communication is discussed in Section 8 and signaling between KMS Domains is discussed in Section 9. Some alternative use cases are discussed in Appendix B.
MIKEY-TICKET offers a framework which is flexible enough to satisfy users with a broad range of security needs. The framework consists of the three exchanges for which different ticket types can be defined. The ticket consists of a ticket policy as well as ticket data. The ticket policy contains information intended for all parties involved whereas the ticket data is only intended for the party that resolves the ticket. The ticket data could be a reference to information (keys etc.) stored by the key management service, it could contain all the information itself, or it could be a combination of the two alternatives. The format of the ticket data depends on the ticket type signaled in the ticket policy. A ticket type called MIKEY base ticket is given in Appendix A and requirements regarding new ticket types are given in Section 10.
As MIKEY-TICKET is based on [RFC3830] , the same terminology, processing and considerations still apply unless otherwise stated. Just like in [RFC3830] , the messages are integrity protected and encryption is only applied to the keys and not to the entire messages. Depending on the mode, the KMS might operate as a KDC (Key Distribution Center) and supply the keys, as a KTC (Key Translation Center) and re-encode and forward keys supplied by the Initiator, or as a combination of the two.
Modes
Depending on the ticket type and the ticket policy, some of the exchanges might be optional or not used at all, see Figure 2 . If the ticket protection is based on a key known only by the KMS, both the Initiator and the Responder have to contact the KMS to request/ resolve tickets (mode 1). If the key used to protect the ticket is shared between the KMS and the Responder, the Ticket Resolve exchange can be omitted (similar to Kerberos), as the Responder can resolve the ticket without assistance from the KMS (mode 2). . This can be seen as a variation of the preshared key method of [RFC3830] with mutual key freshness guarantee.
In mode 1 and 2 the Ticket Request can be omitted if the tickets are distributed in some other way.
Exchanges
Ticket Request
This exchange is used by the Initiator to request keys and a ticket from a trusted KMS, with which the Initiator has pre-shared credentials. The request contains information (e.g. participant identities, etc.) describing the session the ticket is intended to protect. A full roundtrip is required for the Initiator to receive the ticket. The initiation message REQUEST_INIT comes in two variants corresponding to the pre-shared key (PSK) and public-key (PK) methods of [RFC3830] . As this message MUST ensure the identity of the Initiator to the KMS, it SHALL be integrity protected via a MAC based on a pre-shared key or via a signature. The response message REQUEST_RESP is the same for the two variants and SHALL be protected by using the pre-shared/envelope key indicated in the REQUEST_INIT message. The REQUEST_INIT message MUST always include the Header (HDR), Timestamp (T), and RANDi payloads. The CSB ID (Crypto Session Bundle ID) SHALL be assigned as in [RFC3830] . The V flag (in the HDR payload) MUST be set to '1' but SHALL be ignored by the KMS as a response is MANDATORY. As Crypto Sessions (CS) SHALL NOT be handled, the #CS MUST be set to 0 and the CS ID map type SHALL be the "Empty map" as defined in [RFC4563] .
IDRi contains the identity of the Initiator. This identity SHOULD be stored in the granted ticket policy (TP).
IDRkms contains the identity of the KMS. It SHOULD be included, but it MAY be left out when it can be expected that the KMS has a single identity.
TP contains the desired ticket policy (see Section 6.10). It includes for instance, the identities of allowed responders.
The KEMAC payload is used by the Initiator to indicate the number of requested keys, specify other key information (key type, key length, KV (key validity) data [RFC3830] ), and specify the Key Data itself. Initiator specified Key Data in a KMS generated ticket SHOULD NOT be used unless the Initiator has pre-encrypted content and specific TEKs (Traffic Encryption Keys) need to be included in the ticket. See Section 6.2 and Appendix B.2 for details.
Components of the REQUEST_INIT_PSK Message
The IDRi payload SHOULD be included but MAY be left out when it can be expected that the KMS can identify the Initiator by other means.
The KEMAC payload SHOULD use the NULL authentication algorithm, as a MAC is included in the V payload. The encryption key (encr_key) and salt key used to encrypt the KEMAC SHALL be derived from the preshared key (Initiator-KMS) (see Section 4.1.4 of [RFC3830] for key derivation specification). The KEMAC is hence constructed as follows:
The IDRpsk payload is used to indicate the pre-shared key used. It MAY be omitted if the KMS can find the pre-shared key by other means. specification). The MAC SHALL cover the entire message as well as the identities of the involved parties (see Section 5.4 for the exact definition).
Components of the REQUEST_INIT_PK Message
The identity IDRi and certificate CERTi SHOULD be included, but they MAY be left out when it can be expected that the KMS can obtain the certificate in some other manner. If a certificate chain is to be provided, each certificate in the chain SHOULD be included in a separate CERT payload.
PKE contains the encrypted envelope key: PKE = E(PKkms, env_key). It is encrypted using the KMS's public key (PKkms). If the KMS possesses several public keys, the Initiator can indicate the key used in the CHASH payload.
The KEMAC payload MUST include an identity payload (IDRi) and a MAC calculated over the KEMAC. The identity MUST be equal to the identity specified in the certificate. The reason to bind the identity to the keys is to stop a man-in-the-middle-attack where an attacker includes the KEMAC and PKE payloads in a new REQUEST_INIT message with herself as an allowed responder. The encr_key, salt_key, and auth_key SHALL be derived from the envelope key (see Section 4.1.4 of [RFC3830] for key derivation specification). The KEMAC is hence constructed as follows:
KEMAC = E(encr_key, IDRi || {TGK|TEK}) || MAC
SIGNi is a signature covering the entire MIKEY message, using the Initiator's signature key (see Section 5.4 for the exact definition).
Processing the REQUEST_INIT Message
If the KMS can verify the integrity of the received message, the message can be correctly parsed, and the Initiator is authorized to receive the requested ticket, possibly with a modified ticket policy, the KMS MUST send a REQUEST_RESP message. Otherwise the KMS SHOULD send an appropriate Error message. In case of a REQUEST_INIT_PK message, the KMS MUST ensure that the identity in the KEMAC payload is equal to the identity specified in the certificate.
Components of the REQUEST_RESP Message
The Header payload SHOULD be identical to the Header payload in the REQUEST_INIT message with the exception of data type, next payload, and V flag. The V flag has no meaning in this context. It SHALL be set to 0 by the KMS and ignored by the Initiator.
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The timestamp type and value SHALL be identical to the one used in the REQUEST_INIT message.
The TICKET payload carries the granted TP payload and ticket data (see Section 6.9). As the KMS decides which ticket policy to use, this may not be the same ticket policy as the Initiator requested. The ticket type and the ticket data depend on the granted ticket policy.
The KEMAC payload SHOULD use the NULL authentication algorithm, as a MAC is included in the V payload. Depending on the type of REQUEST_INIT message, either the pre-shared key or the envelope key SHALL be used to derive the encr_key and salt_key. If the REQUEST_INIT message does not contain a KEMAC, it is RECOMMENDED that the KMS's default KEMAC includes a single TGK. The KEMAC SHALL include a MIKEY Protection Key (MPK) used as a pre-shared key to protect the messages in the Ticket Transfer exchange. If key forking (see Section 5.1.1) is used (determined by the ticket policy) two MPKs SHALL be included in the KEMAC. The first MPK (MPKi) SHALL be used to protect the TRANSFER_INIT message and the second MPK (MPKr) SHALL be used to verify the TRANSFER_RESP message. The KEMAC is hence constructed as follows:
The last payload SHALL be a Verification payload (V). Depending on the type of REQUEST_INIT message, either the pre-shared key or the envelope key SHALL be used to derive the auth_key. The MAC SHALL cover the entire message as well as the identities of the involved parties (see Section 5.4 for the exact definition).
Processing the REQUEST_RESP Message
If the Initiator can verify the integrity of the received message and the message can be correctly parsed, the ticket and the associated session information SHOULD be stored. Otherwise the Initiator SHOULD silently discard the message.
Before using the received ticket, the Initiator SHOULD check that the granted ticket policy is acceptable. If not, the Initiator SHALL either silently discard or send a new REQUEST_INIT message suggesting a different ticket policy than before.
Ticket Transfer
This exchange is used to transfer a ticket as well as session information from the Initiator to a Responder. The exchange is modeled after the pre-shared key mode [RFC3830] , and the session The TRANSFER_INIT message MUST always include the Header (HDR), Timestamp (T), and RANDi payloads. The CSB ID (Crypto Session Bundle ID) SHALL be assigned as in [RFC3830] . The value of the V flag SHALL agree with the ticket policy (TP) and it SHALL be ignored by the Responder.
The IDRi and IDRr payloads SHOULD be included but they MAY be left out when it can be expected that the Responder has a single identity and can identify the Initiator by other means.
The use of the SP (Security Policy) payload is identical to that in [RFC3830] .
The TICKET payload contains the ticket policy to be applied when resolving the ticket as well as the ticket data.
The last payload SHALL be a Verification payload (V) where the authentication key (auth_key) is derived from the MPK (see Section 5.1.3 for key derivation specification). The MAC SHALL cover the entire message as well as the identities of the involved parties (see Section 5.4 for the exact definition).
Processing the TRANSFER_INIT Message
As This is an early reject mechanism to avoid unnecessary KMS signaling when the Responder can conclude from the information at hand that it will not accept the connection. After the ticket has been resolved the parsing of the TRANSFER_INIT message continues and SHALL be done as in [RFC3830] .
Components of the TRANSFER_RESP Message
The Header payload SHOULD be identical to the Header payload in the TRANSFER_INIT message with the exception that the V flag has no meaning in this context. It SHALL be set to 0 by the Responder and ignored by the Initiator.
The timestamp type and value SHALL be identical to the one used in the TRANSFER_INIT message. roundtrip is required for the Responder to receive the keys. The Ticket Resolve exchange is optional (depending on the ticket policy), and SHOULD only be used when the Responder is unable to resolve the ticket without assistance from the KMS. The initiation message RESOLVE_INIT comes in two variants corresponding to the pre-shared key (PSK) and public-key encryption (PK) methods of [RFC3830] . As this message MUST ensure the identity of the Responder to the KMS, it SHALL be protected via a MAC based on a pre-shared key or via a signature. The response message RESOLVE_RESP is the same for the two variants and SHALL be protected by using the pre-shared/envelope key indicated in the RESOLVE_INIT message. Upon receiving the RESOLVE_INIT message, the KMS verifies that the Responder is allowed to resolve the ticket. The KMS extracts the session information from the ticket and returns this to the Responder. Since the KMS resolved the ticket, the Responder is assured of the integrity of the ticket policy (TP), which contains the identity of the peer that requested or created the ticket. The Responder can complete the session information it got from the Initiator with the additional session information received from the KMS.
Common Components of the RESOLVE_INIT Messages
The RESOLVE_INIT message MUST always include the Header (HDR), Timestamp (T), and RANDr payloads. The CSB ID (Crypto Session Bundle ID) SHALL be assigned as in [RFC3830] . The V flag MUST be set to '1' but SHALL be ignored by the KMS as a response is MANDATORY. As crypto sessions SHALL NOT be handled, the #CS MUST be set to 0 and the CS ID map type SHALL be the "Empty map" as defined in [RFC4563] .
IDRkms SHOULD be included, but it MAY be left out when it can be expected that the KMS has a single identity. The key hierarchy and its dependencies on TRANSFER_INIT message contents for the case without key forking and with a single RAND are illustrated in Figure 3 . The KEMAC is encoded in the TICKET payload.
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The illustrated key derivations are done by the Initiator and the Responder. The constants are taken from the decimal digits of e as described in [RFC3830] .
The key hierarchy and its dependencies on TRANSFER_RESP message contents for the case with key forking and two RANDs are illustrated in Figure 4 . The KEMAC is encoded in the TICKET payload (not shown). MOD is the modifier (IDRr, RANDkms). The two key derivations that produce forked keys are done by the Initiator and the KMS and the the remaining two key derivations are done by the Initiator and the Responder. The The random value RANDi from the TRANSFER_INIT message is also used as input to the derivation of the auth_key and the TEK, but this is omitted from the figure. The protection of the TRANSFER_INIT message is done as in Figure 3 with the exception that MPKi is used.
Expires 
| TBD10 | 6.6 TICKET | TBD11 | 6.9 TP | TBD12 | 6.10 The key data transport payload contains encrypted key data subpayloads. The keys MAY be supplied by the Initiator or the KMS. The number of keys with Key Data supplied by the Initiator SHALL be indicated in the ticket policy (see Section 6.10). Such keys SHALL be placed last, after all keys with Key Data supplied by the KMS.
In the REQUEST_INIT message the KEMAC is used by the Initiator to indicate the number of keys, specify other key information (key type, key length, KV data), and specify the Key Data itself. Initiator specified Key Data in a KMS generated ticket SHOULD NOT be used unless the Initiator has pre-encrypted content and specific TEKs must be included in the ticket. For keys where the KMS should supply Key Data, the Key Data field SHALL be set to 0 by the Initiator and ignored by the KMS.
Note that the MAC coverage depends on the method used. For the ID payload, a new ID type is defined. The byte string type is intended to be used when the ID payload is used to identify a preshared key.
* ID Type (8 bits): specifies the identifier type used.
ID Type | Value ------------+------Byte string | TDB14 Table 6 .5: ID Type (Additions) 6.6. ID Payload with Role Indicator (IDR)
The IDR payload uses all the fields as the standard identity payload (ID) but expands it with a new field describing the role of the ID payload. Whereas the ID Type describes the type of the ID Data, the ID Role describes the meaning of the identity itself. The IDR payload are intended to eliminate ambiguity when a MIKEY message contain several identity payloads. The IDR payload MUST be used instead of the ID payload in all MIKEY-TICKET messages.
Expires The ticket payload contains a TP payload (see Section 6.10 ) as well as ticket data (see Appendix A for an example). The ticket policy contains information intended for all parties involved whereas the ticket data is only intended for the party that resolves the ticket. The ticket type provided in the Ticket Data is indicated in the TP payload. The Next Payload field in the TP subpayload SHALL be set to Last payload. IDRkms contains the identity of a KMS that can resolve the ticket.
IDRi contains the identity of the peer that requested or created the ticket.
TRs is the start of the validity period. AS the NTP timescale wraps around every 136 years, TRs SHALL be interpreted as the matching time closest to the current time. An omitted TRs means that the validity period has no bound in that direction.
TRe is the end of the validity period. TRe SHALL be interpreted to be the first matching time that occur after TRs. If TRs is omitted TRe SHALL be interpreted as the matching time closest to the current time. This gives a maximum (finite) validity time of 136 years. An omitted TRe means that the validity period has no bound in that direction.
IDRapp is an identifier for the allowed application.
IDRr is the identity of a responder or a group of responders that should be allowed to resolve the ticket. If there is more than one responder identity, each responder identity SHALL be included in a separate IDR payload. As the Ticket Transfer exchange terminates in at most one full roundtrip, it is applicable for integration into two-way handshake session or call signaling protocols such as SIP/SDP and RTSP. Such integration of MIKEY within SIP/SDP and RTSP is defined in [RFC4567] . Although any such transport protocol defined for general MIKEY messages can be used for MIKEY-TICKET, it may not be suitable for the MIKEY-TICKET exchanges that do not establish keying material for media sessions (Ticket Request and Ticket Resolve), in which case it has to be defined how MIKEY is transported over the transport protocol in question.
Group Communication
What has been discussed up to now can also be used to distribute group keys for small-size interactive groups. The MIKEY signaling for multi-party sessions can either be centralized (C) or decentralized (D) as illustrated in Figure 5 . In the decentralized scenario, B's and C's identities SHALL be used in the second Ticket Transfer exchange. If a (G)TGK is used a group key, the same RANDi MUST be used in all TRANSFER_INIT messages and in the case of a TGK, RANDr MUST NOT be used in the TRANSFER_RESP message. Note also caveats with ticket reuse in group communication settings as discussed in Section 5.3.
Key Forking
When key forking is used, the MIKEY signaling MUST be centralized to the party that initially requested the ticket. Decentralized signaling does not work, as only the user that requested the ticket could initiate the Ticket Transfer exchange, see Section 5.3.
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Expires Another consideration is that different users get different TEKs if TGKs (not GTGKs) are used, so if the audio mixing is decentralized, a new (non-forked) group key MUST be distributed before the session starts, see Figure 6 . The rekeying does not need to be done with a CSB Updating exchange (see Section 5.2); it can be done with any appropriate rekeying mechanism, e.g. EKT (Encrypted Key Transport) [I-D.mcgrew-srtp-ekt].
Using a group key might also be preferred when centralized audio mixing is used; the mixer does not have to re-encrypt, which minimizes CPU and memory use, and means that an untrusted conferencing server can be used.
Signaling Between Different KMSs
A user can in general only be expected to have a trust relation with a single KMS. Different users might therefore use tickets issued by different KMSs and protected with different keys. Thus, if users with trust relations to different KMSs are to be able to establish a secure session with each other, the KMSs involved have to cooperate and there has to be a trust relation between them. The KMSs SHALL be mutually authenticated and signaling between them SHALL be integrity protected. Under these assumptions, the following approach MAY be used.
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Expires If the Responder cannot directly resolve a ticket, the ticket SHOULD be included in a RESOLVE_INIT message sent to a KMS. If the Responder does not have a shared credential with the KMS that issued the ticket (KMS I) or if the Responder does not know which KMS that issued the ticket, the Responder SHOULD send a RESOLVE_INIT message to the Responder's own KMS (KMS R). If KMS R did not issue the ticket, KMS R would normally be unable to directly resolve the ticket and must hence ask another KMS to resolve it (typically the issuing KMS).
The signaling between different KMSs MAY be done with a Ticket
Resolve exchange as illustrated in Figure 7 . The IDRr and TICKET payloads from the previous RESOLVE_INIT message SHOULD be reused.
Adding New Ticket Types to MIKEY-TICKET
The ticket data (in the TICKET payload) could be a reference to information (keys etc.) stored by the key management service, it could contain all the information itself, or it could be a combination of the two alternatives. For systems serving many users, it is not ideal to use the reference-only ticket approach as this would force the key management service to keep state of all issued tickets that are still valid. Tickets may carry many different types of information helping to enforce usage policies. The policies may be group policies or per-user policies.
Tickets may either be transparent, meaning they can be resolved without contacting the KMS that generated them, or opaque, meaning that the original KMS must be contacted. The ticket information SHOULD typically be integrity protected and certain fields need confidentiality protection, in particular the keys. Other types of information may also require confidentiality protection due to privacy reasons. It may be preferable to include several encrypted ticket protection keys (similar to S/MIME) as this allows multiple peers to resolve the ticket.
The ticket data MUST include information so that the resolving party can retrieve the encoded KEMAC. It MUST also be possible to verify the integrity of the TP payload. It is RECOMMENDED that future specifications use the recommended payload order and do not add any additional payloads or processing. New ticket types SHOULD not change the processing for the Responder. If a new ticket type requires additional processing, it MUST be indicated in the TP payload. New specifications MUST specify which modes are supported and if any additional security considerations apply.
Security Considerations
Unless otherwise stated, the security considerations in [RFC3830] still apply and contain notes on the security properties of the MIKEY protocol, key derivation functions, and other components. As some security properties depend on the specific ticket type, only generic security considerations concerning the MIKEY-TICKET framework are discussed.
General
In addition to the ticket policy the KMS MAY have its own set of policies (allowed key lengths, algorithms, etc.) that in some way are shared with the peers. The KMS MAY also provide keying material to authorized intermediate nodes performing various network functions (e.g. transcoding services, recording services, conference bridges).
The key management service can enforce end-to-end security by only distributing the keys to authorized end-users. As in [RFC3830] the user identities are not confidentiality protected. If user privacy is needed some kind of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) like anonymous or temporary credentials MAY be used.
In the standard MIKEY modes [RFC3830] , the keys are generated by the Initiator (or by both peers in the Diffie-Hellman scheme). If a bad random number generator is used, this is likely to make any key management protocol sensitive to different kinds of attacks, and MIKEY is no exception. As the choice of the random number generator is implementation specific, the easiest (and often bad) choice is to use the PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator) supplied by the operating system. In MIKEY-TICKET's default mode of operation, the key generation is done by the KMS, which can be assumed to be less likely to use a bad random number generator. All keys (including keys used to protect the ticket) MUST have adequate strength/length, e.g. 128 bits or more.
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The use of random nonces (RANDs) in the key derivation is of utmost importance to counter offline pre-computation attacks and other generic attacks. A key of length n, using RANDs of length r, has effective key entropy of (n + r) / 2 against a birthday attack. Therefore, the length of RAND generated by the Initiator MUST at least be equal to the length of the pre-shared key/envelope key and the sum of the lengths of the RANDs (RANDi, RANDr) MUST at least be equal to the key size of the longest TGK.
Note that the CSB Updating messages reuse the old RANDs. This means that the total effective key entropy (relative to pre-computation attacks) for k consecutive key updates, assuming the TGKs are each n bits long, is still no more than n bits. In other words, a 2^n work enables an attacker to get all k n-bit keys. While this might seem like a defect, this is in practice (for all reasonable values of k) not better than brute force, which on average requires k * 2^(n-1) work (even if different RANDs would be used). A birthday attack would only require 2^(n/2) work, but would need access to 2^(n/2) sessions protected with equally many different keys using a single pair of RANDs. This is, for typical values of n, clearly totally infeasible. The success probability of such an attack can be controlled by limiting the number of updates correspondingly. As stated in [RFC3830] , the fact that more than one key can be compromised in a single attack is inherent to any solution using secret-or public-key algorithms. An attacker always gets access to all the exchanged keys by doing an exhaustive search on the preshared key/envelope key/MPK. This requires 2^m work, where m is the effective size of the key.
As the Responder MAY generate a RAND, The Ticket Transfer exchange can provide mutual freshness guarantee for all derived keys.
Denial of Service
This protocol is resistant to Denial of Service attacks against the KMS in the sense that it does not construct any state (at the key management protocol level) before it has authenticated the Initiator or Responder. Typical prevention such as rate-limiting and ACL (Access Control List) capability SHOULD be implemented in the KMS as well as the clients. The types and amount of prevention needed depends on how critical the system is and may vary depending on the ticket type. suspicious, if the policy is not acceptable, etc., before attempting a RESOLVE_INIT with the KMS.
Replay
In a replay attack an attacker may intercept and later retransmit the whole or part of a MIKEY message, attempting to trick the receiver (Responder or KMS) into undesired operations, leading e.g. to lack of key freshness. MIKEY-TICKET implements several mechanisms to prevent and detect such attacks. Timestamps together with a replay cache efficiently stop the replay of entire MIKEY messages. Parts of the received messages (or their hashes) can be saved in the replay cache until their timestamp is outdated. To prevent replay attacks, the sender's (Initiator or Responder) and the receiver's identity (Responder or KMS) is always included in the MAC/Signature calculation.
An attacker may also attempt to replay a ticket by inserting it into a new MIKEY message. A possible scenario is that Alice and Bob first communicate based on a ticket, which an attacker Mallory intercepts. Later, Mallory (acting as herself) invites Bob by inserting the ticket into her own TRANSFER_INIT message. Unless Mallory has knowledge of the MPK encoded in the ticket, such replays will be detected when Bob has resolved the ticket. If Mallory has knowledge of the MPK (i.e. she is authorized to resolve the ticket) and key forking is used together with a TGK, Mallory will not be able to communicate with Bob due to her inability to deduce the session keys.
If key forking is not used or a TEK or GTGK is used, the session key is a group key and there is no attack. For the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED to use key forking and TGKs unless required by the use case.
Forking
Forking occurs when a Responder is registered on several devices (e.g. mobile phone, fixed phone, and computer) or when an invite is being made to addresses of the type somebody@company.example, a group of users where only one is supposed to answer. The Initiator may not even always know exactly who the authorized group members are. To prevent all forms of eavesdropping, only the endpoint that answers should get access to the session keys.
When key forking is used together with TGKs, the keys are modified, making them cryptographically unique for each responder targeted by the forking. As only the Initiator and the KMS have access to the master TGKs, no one else can derive the session keys. In a group scenario, only authorized group members must have access to the keys. In some situation, the communication may be initiated by the Initiator using a group identity and the Initiator may not even know exactly who the authorized group members are. Moreover, group membership may change over time due to leaves/joins. In such a situation, it is foremost the responsibility of the KMS to reject ticket resolution requests from unauthorized responders, implying that the KMS needs to be able to map an individual's identity (carried in the RESOLVE_INIT message) to group membership (where the group identity is carried in the ticket).
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As noted, reuse of tickets, which bypasses the KMS, is NOT RECOMMENDED when the Initiator is not fully ensured about group membership status.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Fredrik Ahlqvist, Rolf Blom, Yi Cheng, Lakshminath Dondeti, Vesa Lehtovirta, Fredrik Lindholm, Mats Naslund, Karl Norrman, Brian Rosenberg, Bengt Sahlin, Wei Yinxing, and Zhu Yunwen for their support and valuable comments.
IANA Considerations
This document defines several new values for the namespaces Data Type, Next Payload, TS Type, ID Type, Error no, and Key Data Type defined in [RFC3830] . The following IANA assignments were added to the MIKEY Payload registry (in bracket is a reference to the table containing the registered values):
o Data Type (see Table 6 .1) o Next Payload (see Table 6 .2) o TS Type (see Table 6 .3) o ID Type (see Table 6 .5) o Error no (see Table 6 .7)
o Key Data Type (see Table 6 .8)
The TR payload defines an 8-bit TS Role field for which IANA is to create and maintain a new namespace in the MIKEY Payload registry.
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Assignments consist of a TS Role name and its associated value. Values in the range 1-239 SHOULD be approved by the process of Specification Required, values in the range 240-254 are for Private Use, and the values 0 and 255 are Reserved according to [RFC5226] . The initial contents of the registry should be as follows:
Value TS Role -------------------------------------0
Reserved 1
Time of issue (TRi)  2 Start of validity period (TRs) 3
End of validity period (TRe) 4
Reykeying interval (TRr) 5-239
Unassigned 240-254 Private Use 255 Reserved
The IDR payload defines an 8-bit ID Role field for which IANA is to create and maintain a new namespace in the MIKEY Payload registry. Assignments consist of an ID Role name and its associated value. Values in the range 1-239 SHOULD be approved by the process of Specification Required, values in the range 240-254 are for Private Use, and the values 0 and 255 are Reserved according to [RFC5226] . The initial contents of the registry should be as follows:
Initiator (IDRi)  2 Responder (IDRr)  3 KMS (IDRkms)  4 Pre-Shared Key (IDRpsk) 5
Application (IDRapp) 6-239 Unassigned 240-254 Private Use 255 Reserved
The TP payload defines an 16-bit Ticket Type field for which IANA is to create and maintain a new namespace in the MIKEY Payload registry. Assignments consist of a Ticket Type name and its associated value. Values in the range 1-61439 SHOULD be approved by the process of Specification Required, values in the range 61440-65534 are for Private Use, and the values 0 and 65535 are Reserved according to [RFC5226] . The initial contents of the registry should be as follows:
